Short note on Ignorantia Juris Non Excusat

Ignorantia Juris Non Excusat, a Latin term, means ignorance of Law is not an excuse. A person who is unaware of a law may not escape liability for violating that law merely because he was unaware of its content. 

In Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. Govt. of U.P.f 1975) 4 SCC 378, the Supreme Court held that “Every individual is deemed to know the law of the land. The courts merely interpret the law and do not make law. Ignorance of law is not an excuse for not taking appropriate steps within limitation.

Madhya Pradesh High Court in Dolatram v. Kishan, 1999 (2) MPLJ 620 held that “ignorantia juris non excusat” is not an inflexible rule when the Court is dealing with the case of a rustic farmer.

Lord Mansfield said it would be hard upon the profession (i.e. legal profession) if the law was so certain that everybody knew it. Eminent jurists have therefore, discarded this fiction and stated that the true rule is not that everyone is presumed to know law but that ignorance of law will not be permitted as an excuse.

The relentless rigour with which this maxim has been generally applied in all criminal proceeding has been justified by well know writers on jurisprudence on three grounds:

(1) Law, in theory, at any rate, is definite and knowable. Hence innocent and inevitable ignorance of law is impossible.

(2) The ground of necessity- if this maxim is relaxed every accused will take the plea that he did not know the law and it will be almost impossible for the prosecution to show affirmatively that he knew the law in question. Hence for the sake of any benefit derivable from a relaxation of this maxim it is not advisable to weaken the administration of justice by making liability dependent on well-nigh inscrutable conditions touching knowledge or means of knowledge of the law.

(3) Criminal law rests on certain moral principles and hence when a person breaks the law though he may be ignorant of the provisions of law he knows very well that he is breaking the rule of right.

(4) Though these grounds are undoubtedly valid and weighty nevertheless modern jurists recognise that they do not constitute an altogether sufficient basis for so stringent and severe rule.